

Roman Diplomacy and the End of the Third Macedonian War

After the first two Macedonian Wars, Rome was content to leave Macedon with their own political system and their own state; this was Roman practice with defeated enemies until 168 BC, when Rome conquered the Macedonians in the third Macedonian War. At the settlement of the third Macedonian War in 167 BC at Amphipolis, Rome divided Macedon into four regions, instituted separate governments for each, and imposed trade restrictions, as told by Livy in Book 45.29. Looking at the settlements concluding several of Rome's major conflicts before 167 and after 167 shows that the settlement at Amphipolis represents a shift in Roman diplomacy toward an imperial mindset.

Scholarship on Roman diplomacy during the Republic is dominated by two camps of International Relations theory, realism and constructivism. This study addresses two models for Roman diplomacy: the constructivist *amicitia* model put forth by Paul Burton (Burton 2011), and Arthur Eckstein's realist model of unipolarity (Eckstein 2008). Burton's work looks at Roman diplomacy through the specific terminology, focusing on relationships of *amicitia* and the social expectations of diplomatic language. He addresses the absence of textual grounding in realist theories, but underplays the ways Rome interacts with states after *amicitia* has broken down. Eckstein's model of Rome taking the place at the top of the Mediterranean in an environment of unipolarity holds up, but Eckstein only addresses Rome's place in the Mediterranean up to 170 BC. This paper argues that the Roman diplomatic decisions at Amphipolis in 167 and the following ones are markedly different from previous ones.

There are two specific strategies employed by Rome at Amphipolis that clearly delineate their intentions from previous settlements: 1) an active role in determining the government of the

defeated state, and 2) economic warfare to hinder the defeated state from posing a threat to the conqueror; the primary focus of this paper will be the latter. Prior to 167 the economic sections of Rome's settlements were intended to recover costs of war and to right wrongs of aggression. When one analyzes the specific boundaries of the regions and the potential results of the economic restrictions dictated by Rome a very different intent becomes clear: to build four states that are sustainable but unable to achieve the economic success that made Macedon a threat to Rome.

The boundaries and restrictions Rome enforces in 167 BC are little discussed, but they hold the key to understanding Rome's strategy of economic warfare. The base borderlines are relatively simple: rivers, mountains; the Roman general Paulus, however, makes several exceptions to these boundaries concerning specific cities and localities that only make sense in an economic light (Livy 45.29.5-10). The new borders cross natural boundaries like rivers, divide ethnic groups, and are not particularly equitable in terms of space allotted. Analyzing the economic value of smaller localities to the larger regions and Macedon as a whole is possible through the economic and geographic work of historians like N.G.L Hammond and Eugene Borza. The trade restrictions Paulus gives to the Macedonians only serve to reinforce the weak but sustainable goal of the boundary lines, concerning themselves with family ties and trade across regions, mineral mining, and timber cutting (Livy 45.29.10-14).

The economic warfare and dismantling of the Macedonian government were unprecedented practices in treaties for Rome. Previously, Rome's treaties were concerned with righting the wrongs of aggression committed by the defeated state. By looking at the treaties of the Second Punic War, the Second Macedonian War, and the Seleucid War through the theories of Burton and Eckstein, a pattern emerges for Roman diplomacy at the close of conflict. The

close of the Third Macedonian War is a marked shift from that pattern. This paradigm shift in diplomacy represents a shift toward Mediterranean empire in the Roman mind, and suggests that the Romans are acting on it by 167.

Examining the language of the settlement at Amphipolis in comparison to Rome's established pattern of diplomacy brings new light to Burton's and Eckstein's theories on Roman diplomacy. Burton talks about how relationships of *amicitia* deteriorate for Rome, but this study looks at how Rome redefines those relationships after they have broken and how Amphipolis represents a shift moving from Eckstein's unipolarity toward empire.

Works Cited

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